We don't want to be left behind.

The argument

The DMA should prove that delaying access is worth it.

The DMA assumes that short-term limits on major technology providers will be offset by future gains from alternative services. That trade-off should be measured, not assumed.

1. 

   Delayed launches are consumer-welfare losses.

   Rule: When EU users receive major features later than users elsewhere, they lose immediate utility, productivity, accessibility, and choice.

   Analogy: If a public service opens months later in one region than another, residents there do not merely wait; they lose the value of the service during the delay.

   Implication: The Commission should treat delayed access to Siri AI, iPhone Mirroring, AirPods Live Translation, and similar features as a measurable consumer cost.

2. 

   The promised gains need evidence.

   Rule: The DMA assumes that obligations imposed today will be offset by future gains from alternative providers.

   Analogy: It is not enough to build an extra exit if almost nobody uses it; the benefit depends on whether people actually change their behavior.

   Implication: The review should measure real uptake and usage of DMA-created alternatives, not only whether companies created the required technical access.

3. 

   Sensitive device features are not ordinary APIs.

   Rule: Interoperability involving messages, notifications, files, voice assistants, location, or device control touches private user data and device security.

   Analogy: A hospital can share records with other providers, but only after identity, consent, audit, and security controls are in place.

   Implication: Regulators should require privacy-preserving boundaries first, then mandate access where those boundaries are technically realistic.

4. 

   Self-preferencing rules should be targeted.

   Rule: Self-preferencing can harm competition, but the remedy should match the specific exclusionary conduct.

   Analogy: A competition remedy should work like a targeted injunction: it should stop the harmful practice without blocking lawful and useful conduct around it.

   Implication: A broad rule can discourage integrated features in Europe even where no safe third-party interface exists yet.

5. 

   Review outcomes, not only obligations.

   Rule: A rule should be judged by whether consumers are better off, not only by whether companies satisfy formal requirements.

   Analogy: A public policy evaluation should not stop at whether a rule was followed; it should ask whether the policy produced the promised public benefit.

   Implication: The relevant outcomes include delayed launches, real adoption of alternatives, added friction, privacy risk, and actual switching behavior.

6. 

   Competition policy should not reduce practical choice.

   Rule: If Europeans receive fewer features, later launches, and uncertain alternatives, the scope of the rule should be reassessed.

   Analogy: A market-opening rule should not leave consumers with fewer usable options while promising that better options may arrive later.

   Implication: Consumer choice includes the ability to use integrated first-party features when they are useful, private, and available in other democratic markets.